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The Exxon Valdez Resurfaces in the Gulf of Mexico  
... and the Hazards of “Megasystem Centripetal Di-Polarity” 
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38 Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review 389 (2011) 
 
Abstract: The 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon blowout spill in the Gulf of 
Mexico shocked the nation with the amount of oil and harm it unleashed 
upon the Gulf and its natural and human ecosystems. As details of the 
calamity became available, they revealed frustrating parallels to the 1989 
Exxon Valdez oil spill in the Gulf of Alaska in terms of causation and 
impaired response capability. Similar systemic deficits characterized the 
actions of corporate managers and state and federal regulators in the oil 
industry of both Gulfs. In a “di-polar” system where industry and gov-
ernment regulators are supposed to counterbalance one another, but in-
stead come too close together, responsible overall management of opera-
tions and risks suffers. The lessons and recommendations incorporated 
in the 1990 Alaska Oil Spill Commission’s Final Report on the Exxon 
Valdez spill, including watchdog citizen councils, were highly germane 
but largely ignored or forgotten in the decades between the Alaska Re-
port’s  release and the 2010 BP tragedy. This Article reviews the Gulf of 
Mexico spill in light of the Gulf of Alaska spill, and notes how this time 
around we must finally learn how to deal more seriously with the mega-
risks posed when di-polar convergences occur in these megasystems of 
hydrocarbon production and transport. 
                                                                                                                           
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. The author chaired the State of Alas-
ka Oil Commission’s legal task force after the 1989 wreck of the M.S. Exxon Valdez. This 
Article is built upon a shorter piece, Learning From Disasters: Twenty-One Years After the 
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, Will Reactions to the Deepwater Horizon Blowout Finally Address the 
Systemic Flaws Revealed in Alaska? (available at http://www.elr.info/articles/vol40/40.11041.pdf, pub-
lished as part of an Environmental Law Institute Report. Both pieces benefited from the 
help, gratefully acknowledged, of two research assistants, Brendan Boyle and Joseph 
Horton, both of the Boston College Law School Class of 2012. The views expressed here, 
other than those cited to the Commission and other sources, are the author’s own and not 
those of the Commission or of my research assistants. Given the on-rolling current events 
underlying this present analysis, a number of citations herein are necessarily given to 
press accounts which may be revised with further information. While noting this caveat, 
it is evident that many solid journalistic reports have come from the oiled waters and 
beaches of the Gulf, and that over time the factual record will, of course, be substantially 
deepened by historical vetting. 
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Introduction 
 Twenty-one years ago, after the calamitous Exxon Valdez oil spill 
in Alaska’s Prince William Sound, the pervasive systemic flaws—that 
made a major calamity in the Gulf of Alaska not just possible, but 
probable1—were largely cloaked behind the figure of a captain with a 
drinking problem.2 By any analysis, the Gulf of Mexico calamity, al-
most twenty times larger than the Exxon Valdez spill,3 was, like the 
1989 spill, a systemic dysfunction resulting from marked shortcom-
ings of industry and government regulation in multiple aspects of the 
overall oil production and transport process, not an exceptional 
anomaly attributable to just one well, one company, or one derelic-
tion.4 
                                                                                                                           
1 See Alaska Oil Spill Comm’n, Final Report: SPILL: The Wreck of the Exxon Valdez: 
Implications for Safe Transport of Oil 206 (1990) [hereinafter Alaska Comm’n Report], avail-
able at http://www.arlis.org/docs/vol1/B/33339870.pdf. The Alaska Commission issued 
an extensive final report with appendices, available through the Alaska Resources Library 
and Information Services website, http://www.arlis.org/docs/vol2/a/EVOS_FAQs. 
pdf. 
2 See Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 7. 
3 See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Learning from Disasters: Twenty-One Years After the Exxon 
Valdez Oil Spill, Will Reactions to the Deepwater Horizon Blowout Finally Address the System-
ic Flaws Revealed in Alaska? 40 Envtl. L. Rep. 11,041, 11,041 n.2 (2010). The Exxon Valdez 
spill is generally reported as having released approximately 250,000 barrels, or almost 
eleven million gallons, of crude oil. See Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at iii. Esti-
mates of the total oil released in the Gulf have been contentious; however, the govern-
ment now estimates that the BP Deepwater blowout spill now appears to have released 
roughly five million barrels, at a rate between 50,000 to 60,000 barrels per day from April 
20, 2010, until a top cap was applied on July 15, 2010. See Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deep-
water Horizon Oil Spill & Offshore Drilling, Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the 
Future of Offshore Drilling 146–47, 167 (2011) [hereinafter BP Commission Report]. It 
appears that BP will challenge this estimate because, among other reasons, fines are 
based on the total oil released. See Robert L. Cavnar, BP Wins: EPA Will Agree to Cut Oil 
Spill Estimate, Huffington Post (Feb. 2, 2011, 9:07 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost. 
com/robert-l-cavnar/bp-wins-epa-will-agree-to_b_817327.html. 
4 Though the systemic similarities of the two spills are the focus of this analysis, it 
should be noted that there are marked physical differences between the two spills. No oil 
spill, of course, like no coastal setting, is exactly like any other. The shores of coastal Alaska 
are very different from the reedy marshes and beaches of the Gulf coast in ecology and 
climate. Oiled sandy beaches may be easier to clean than cobbled stone beaches where the 
oil penetrates deeply. Marshes, however, are far more problematic. Plater, supra note 3, at 
11,042 & n.5. Warmer temperatures can break down oil faster. Cassie Rodenberg, How Oil 
Breaks Down in Water, Popular Mechanics (May 7, 2010 11:21 AM), 
http://www.popularmechanics.com/ 
science/energy/coal-oil-gas/oil-spill-water-chemistry. The winds and currents of the Gulf 
of Mexico are more complex than in the Gulf of Alaska. See Pete Spotts, Gulf Oil Spill Driven 
by Complex Ocean Currents and Eddies, Christian Sc. Monitor (May 15, 2010), http://www. 
 
2011] Lessons Lost: Megasystems in Alaska & the Gulf 3 
 The system of oil production and transport in the Gulf of Mexico 
area, as in Alaska, is a sprawling, complex, multi-corporation, multi-
agency megasystem, presenting multiplied points of risk and magni-
fied potential for a mega-catastrophe.5 
 The central proposition of this Article, and a primary recommen-
dation of the State of Alaska Oil Spill Commission in 1990, is that 
megasystems, with the potential for mega-catastrophe, require signifi-
cant expansion of institutional perspectives beyond the traditional de-
fault configuration of public-private industry governance.6 The stand-
ard governance design in modern society, including governance of 
megasystems like the oil production and transportation sphere, is im-
plicitly a “di-polar” arrangement7—a public-private societal govern-
ing structure comprised of two theoretically counter-balancing estab-
                                                                                                                           
csmonitor.com/USA/2010/0515/Gulf-spill-oil-driven-by-complex-ocean-currents-and-
eddies. 
The Exxon Valdez oil spill soiled a coastal impact zone inhabited by no more than 
30,000 people, with a sparse economy and only one state jurisdiction. Plater, supra note 3, 
at 11,042. The Gulf of Mexico’s affected coastal impact zone is home to nearly fourteen 
million people (if including the coastal impact zone population of Texas) with a complex 
coast-oriented economy in five separate states. U.S. Census Bureau, P25–1139, Coastline 
Population Trends in the United States: 1960 to 2008, at 9 (2010). In the Gulf of Mexico the 
defendants’ financial liability is likely to be commensurately much larger than Exxon’s 
payout in Alaska. Plater, supra note 3, at 11,042. Exxon paid roughly $5 billion—
compensatory settlements of $507.5 million paid to private and municipal plaintiffs, 
which doubled in punitive damages after Exxon Shipping v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008), $30 
million in interest, criminal fines of $25 million, plus $125 million in criminal restitution, 
$900 million in civil settlement with Alaska and theUnited States, and approximately $2.4 
billion in remediation expenses. Some of these amounts appear to have been covered by 
insurance or offsets. A precedent-setting Exxon Valdez “re-opener” clause was triggered 
in 2006 by Alaska’s request for an additional $92 million for ecological damages. See Plat-
er, supra note 3, at 11,042 & n.6. See generally William H. Rodgers, Jr. et al., The Exxon 
Valdez Reopener: Natural Resources Damage Settlements and Roads Not Taken, 22 Alaska L. 
Rev. 135 (2005) (urging the State of Alaska and the United States to seek enforcement of 
the Reopener Clause). 
5 BP Played Central Role in Botched Containment of 1989 Exxon Valdez Disaster, Democracy 
Now (May 26, 2010), 
http://www.democracynow.org/2010/5/26/bp_played_central_role_in_botched. 
6 See generally Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at v, 129, 139–40. 
7 I have adapted the description of the standard model of traditional modern societal 
governance as “di-polar,” from a phrase used by Professor Lon Fuller in a slightly differ-
ent context. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353, 
383 (1978); Zygmunt J. B. Plater, Dealing with Dumb and Dumber: The Continuing Mission of 
Citizen Environmentalism 20 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 25 (2005). On one pole is the market dy-
namo that drives our economy, generating innovation, wealth, jobs, culture, and negative 
externalities like pollution as well—and on the other, government agencies hold the pri-
mary role and responsibility of counterbalancing the excesses of the marketplace econo-
my. 
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lishments. On one side are the industry players in the marketplace, 
generating jobs, technology, wealth, and political power. On the other 
side are regulatory agencies, state and federal, tasked with monitoring 
the industry and protecting the public from industry’s market failure 
externalities. As the Exxon Valdez spill revealed, however, and as 
decades of political scientists have described as “iron triangles”8 and 
“agency capture,”9 the counter-balancing “poles” too often incline 
centripetally10 into each other. The industry and agency players are 
too easily pulled together into a combined culture of complacency, 
collusion, and neglect.11 
                                                                                                                           
8 The concept of “iron triangles” is a political science rubric that offers broad utility 
in understanding how modern government in reality functions, which often doesn’t re-
semble the process described in civics textbooks. “Iron triangles” are formed by the rela-
tionship among a regulated industry, the governmental agency (or agencies), and the bloc of 
legislators that hold especially strong affinities for that industry sector, typically served by 
a specialized cadre of lobbyists. See, e.g., Fred Powledge, Water: The Nature, Uses, and 
Future of Our Most Precious and Abused Resource 286–89 (1982). Each point of the tri-
angle looks out for and serves the other two points in political and economic terms. See 
id. The narrowed, focused interests of each of these triangles creates a powerful political 
status quo in their sector of governance, each point of the triangle motivated by its own 
intricate system of rewards. See id. In government as well as geometry, triangles are the 
strongest of all geometric shapes. The “iron triangle” term has useful descriptive applica-
tion in a wide variety of special interest settings, some more benign than others. See id. 
There are iron triangles for mining, timber, chemicals, ranching and rangelands, highway 
construction, public works pork barrels, the defense procurement industry, as well as for 
education, medicine and hospitals, sewage treatment, NASA, and more. See id. 
9 In political science, “agency capture” is a well-known tendency of industry-agency 
convergence, and is part of the iron triangle phenomenon. A regulatory agency created in 
the fervor of a popular movement to regulate some designated problem may begin its life 
energetically pursuing the overall public interest, but over time its initiative gradually 
may be eroded into narrower views, intimately linked with the industry and problems it 
was intended to solve. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative 
Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1669, 1684–87 (1975). Justice William O. Douglas said that “as I told 
my old friend, . . . Franklin Delano Roosevelt, . . . he should make every regulatory agen-
cy terminate after ten years. That’s all the time they’ll have to be effective before they are 
tamed.” The author recalls Justice Douglas saying this to a class of his at the University of 
Tennessee (spring semester 1974); according to the author’s recollection, on other occa-
sions Douglas reportedly stated the optimal agency lifetime as five years, not ten. 
10 Centripetally: “moving or tending to move toward a center.” Oxford American 
Dictionary and Thesaurus 225 (2003). 
11 See Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 5, 186, 205–06. 
[A] general complacency had come to permeate the operation and oversight 
of the entire system. . . . Privatization and self-regulation in oil transporta-
tion contributed to the complacency and neglect that helped cause the wreck 
of the Exxon Valdez. . . . Success bred complacency; complacency bred ne-
glect; neglect increased the risk—until the right combination of errors finally 
led to an accident of disastrous proportions. All parties—the shippers, 
Alyeska, the Coast Guard and the State of Alaska—shared in the compla-
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 The major oil spill calamities in the two Gulfs have demonstrated 
that the standard di-polar governance model for oil megasystems 
produces a complex but poorly coordinated, insufficiently vigilant, 
risk-prone plexus that cannot be relied upon for human or ecological 
safety. This failing is only multiplied as drilling pushes ever farther 
and deeper to develop hydrocarbons. 
 To reform the problematic inertias observed within the Alaska oil 
megasystem, the Alaska Commission made fifty-nine substantial rec-
ommendations, more than half of them relevant to oil megasystems 
beyond Alaska.12 One of the more significant recommendations was 
the call for creation of unique citizen councils.13 The Commission 
urged that the traditional public-private management arrangement be 
significantly expanded by institutionalizing a savvy citizen watchdog 
presence within the system—regional citizen advisory councils 
(RCACs).14 The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA-90) incorporated that 
recommendation for Alaska waters,15 and the experience of RCACs in 
Alaska shows the promise and the challenges of integrating citizen 
action.16 
 The Commission’s innovative recommendation to create RCACs 
not only changed the public management perspectives of oil produc-
tion and transport in Alaska,17 it also provides a potentially instruc-
tive model for managing oil production and other industrial megasys-
tems in modern industrial democracies. Properly designed and 
implemented, RCACs provide a pluralistic structural design for gov-
erning, breaking up the centripetal tendencies of the usual agency-
industry di-polar system. The 2011 Report to the President by the Na-
                                                                                                                           
cency that produced this result. . . . [There was] a low level of vigilance and 
a discomforting level of comfort between the industry and Coast Guard 
regulators. State regulation had been withdrawn. 
Id. 
12 See id. at 129–71. 
13 See id. at 139–40 (Recommendation 12). 
14 See id. at 131 (Recommendation 3); see also id. at 139–40 (Recommendation 12), 146 
(Recommendation 26), 163 (Recommendation 49). 
15 33 U.S.C. § 2732(d) (2006). 
16 See infra Part III. 
17 Joseph Horton, Citizen Watchdogs: Insulating Regional Citizen Advisory Coun-
cils—Lessons Learned from the RCACs of Prince William Sound and Cook Inlet, D.105, 
at 3–5 (Nov. 5, 2010) (unpublished research memorandum), available at 
http://www.bc.edu/ 
environmentallaw (follow “Boston College Law School Land & Environmental Law Pro-
gram Submission to the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 
and Offshore Drilling” hyperlink). 
6 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 38:2 
tional Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Off-
shore Drilling (“National Commission”) proposes to bring the innova-
tive RCAC concept to the Gulf.18 
 The hard systemic lessons learned twenty-one years ago in Alas-
ka were largely forgotten or diluted over subsequent years, even the 
few Alaska Commission recommendations that were partially incor-
porated into OPA-90.19 The question for national energy law and poli-
cy now is whether, this time around, we will acknowledge and im-
plement the lessons for hard systemic change largely avoided two 
decades ago. There are many promising areas for reform, as noted in 
the work of the National Commission.20 The innovative RCACs con-
stitute one significant potential improvement in the oil megasystem. 
The Deepwater Horizon tragedy will be a doubly disastrous occasion 
if it does not produce systemic changes for the future, as the Exxon 
Valdez spill markedly failed to do. As White House Chief of Staff 
Rahm Emanuel said in another context, “You never want a serious 
crisis to go to waste.” 21 
I. Megasystems 
 Analyzing the role of oil production and transport in the life of 
modern society, the Alaska Commission described its broad and deep 
complexity as a “megasystem”: 
[The world’s oil companies] have created a megasystem that car-
ries oil from wellheads in the far corners of the earth to refineries in 
its major industrial centers. But this megasystem is fragile. It re-
quires careful scrutiny from outside the industry in design, con-
struction and operation. When it fails...entire coastlines are at risk.  
...Alaskans assume such peril daily....Other Americans on three 
coasts face just as ominous a threat.... What will reduce these 
risks? Obviously, the present system, providing minimum penal-
ties for creating massive environmental damage, has not deterred 
the industry from putting the coasts and oceans of the world at 
continual risk. The system calls out for reform. The mission of 
this commission is to explain what must be done and why.22 
                                                                                                                           
18 See BP Commission Report, supra note 3, at 212, 268–69, 281. 
19 Joe Stephens, Lessons from Exxon Valdez Spill Have Gone Unheeded, Wash. Post (July 14, 
2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/07/13/AR2010071306291.html. 
20 See BP Commission Report, supra note 3, at 249–91. 
21 Gerald F. Seib, In Crisis, Opportunity for Obama, Wall St. J., Nov. 21, 2008, at A2. 
22 Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at v. 
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 The BP blowout in the Gulf reflects virtually the same intercon-
nected megasystem complexities and the same lack of unitary over-
sight, inconsistent vigilance, and shortcutting as revealed in Alaska in 
the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez spill. The Alaska Commission con-
cluded that the tragic incident was not primarily attributable to a cap-
tain’s drinking, but rather that an accident of that nature and caliber 
was probably inevitable.23 As the Alaska Commission concluded, the 
Exxon Valdez spill was the predictable result of a megasystem that 
had developed a pervasive culture of complacency, collusion, and ne-
glect.24 But for the most part these lessons were subsequently forgot-
ten or diluted.25 As the Alaska Commission gathered research and 
evidence in the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez spill, however, the 
commissioners were repeatedly confronted with examples of deficien-
cies throughout the corporate and governmental management of the 
sprawling interconnected aggregation of elements that was the Alaska 
oil enterprise.26 
 The Alaska Commission’s report, instead of merely focusing on 
the 1989 calamity’s tanker transport element as initially planned, ulti-
mately addressed issues that presented serious risks throughout all 
stages of the oil production and transport process. Problematic con-
cerns were identified stretching from the various oil production areas 
on Alaska’s North Slope, across 800 miles of pipeline and pumping 
stations, across three mountain ranges, to the large tank farm holding 
facilities, onto the wharves—where tanker loading crews had been cut 
back to save money—and along a 2000-mile tanker route to refineries 
at Long Beach, California.27 Throughout that megasystem, risky cost-
                                                                                                                           
23 See id. at 7 (“It was the result of the gradual degradation of oversight and safety 
practices that had been intended, 12 years before, to safeguard and backstop the inevita-
ble mistakes of human beings.”). 
24 See id. at 206. 
25 Stephens, supra note 19. 
26 See generally Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 129–71 (Findings and Rec-
ommendations). The deficiencies are noted throughout the Report text and reflected in 
the Recommendations as deficits requiring reform: the need to compensate for deficiency 
in prevention safety prioritizing (see Recommendation 1, 2, 4, 6, 8); need for best availa-
ble technology in corporate and agency implementation (Recommendation 7); need for 
better state agency vigilance over corporate practices (Recommendations 10, 14–17, 25, 
43–46); need for better federal agency presence in overseeing corporate practices (Rec-
ommendations 29–31); deficiencies in environmental safety reporting (Recommendation 
33); deficiencies in governmental and corporate incident response planning (Recommen-
dations 14, 18, 22, 38–45, 48–51). See id. 
27 See Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 5; Pipeline Facts, Alyeska Pipeline Ser-
vice Co., http://www.alyeska-pipe.com/pipelinefacts.html (last updated May 28, 2010). 
According to the Alaska Commission’s Chairman and Executive Director, the Commis-
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cutting by Alyeska, the industry consortium—dominated in fact by 
BP28—that ran the Alaska oil system, and the acquiescence of under-
vigilant government agencies, driven by profits, politics, and the ne-
cessities of oil supply, made breakdowns in operations and response 
possible.29 
 As ongoing investigations in the aftermath of the BP Deepwater 
Horizon blowout spill have revealed, there are fragilities and serious 
points of risk throughout the Gulf of Mexico oil megasystem as well,30 
and not just for wells at great depth. The BP Deepwater Horizon blow-
out was not an exceptional anomaly.31 Here is the apparent syllogism: 
                                                                                                                           
sion found deficiencies throughout the oil extraction and transport megasystem, and that 
is why the commissioners ultimately widened the focus from just addressing tanker 
transport. “But I wish we’d gotten more about pipelines into OPA-90,” said the Chair-
man. Telephone interview with Walter Parker, Chairman, Alaska Oil Spill Comm’n (Mar. 
17, 2011); Telephone interview with John E. Havelock, Executive Director, Alaska Oil 
Spill Comm’n (Mar. 17, 2011). 
A rough map graphic submitted to the Alaska Commission by the Boston College Exx-
on Valdez student research group, and used in some of the Commission discussions, illus-
trated the different interconnected sectors that constituted an integrated system with risks 
(often including catastrophic risks) throughout. See Bos. C. L. Sch. Land & Envtl L. Program 
Submission to the Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & Offshore Drill-
ing, app. D.100 (Nov. 5, 2010), available at http://www.bc.edu/environmentallaw (follow 
“Boston College Law School Land & Environmental Law Program Submission to the Na-
tional Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling” hyper-
link). 
28 BP, at the time of the Exxon Valdez spill, had a 50.01% controlling interest within 
the seven-corporation Alyeska consortium, which meant that the Alyeska consortium’s 
operational decisions, much criticized by the Alaska Commission report, were driven by 
BP’s majority position. See Noaki Schwartz, BP Had a Key Role in the Exxon Valdez Disaster, 
ABC News, May 25, 2010, 
http://www.pottsmerc.com/articles/2010/05/25/news/doc4b 
fbbfae49ac8813211300.txt. 
29 See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, A Modern Political Tribalism in Natural Resources Manage-
ment, 11 Pub. Land L. Rev. 1, 6–10 (1990). These cost-cutting, risk-enhancing measures 
contributed substantially to causing the Alaska spill, including the exhaustion of tanker 
crew personnel and inadequate radar, and to major deficiencies in response capabilities 
after the spill occurrence. Id.; see also Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 35 (“Alt-
hough the U.S. Coast Guard promised to push for both systems, by the time the oil was 
flowing in 1977 the agency had not installed either full-coverage radar or any other elec-
tronic surveillance in the sound.”). 
30 See BP Commission Report, supra note 3, at vii, 2, 62, 71, 78–83, 140, 174–96. 
31 See id. at 122. The Commission found that the Minerals Management Service 
(MMS) lacked the resources, experience, and training to adequately ensure safe oil plat-
form operations. Id. at 57, 126–27. The “root causes [of the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil 
Spill] are systemic and, absent significant reform in both industry practices and govern-
ment policies, might well recur. The missteps were rooted in systemic failures by indus-
try management (extending beyond BP to contractors that serve the industry), and also 
by failures of government to provide effective regulatory oversight of offshore drilling.” 
Id. at 122–23. 
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the greater the size, complexity, and technical sophistication of the el-
ements of a megasystem, the greater the risk of mega-catastrophe—
and the greater the need for extreme vigilance in design, coordination, 
and operation. Yet the bigger such megasystems become, the harder it 
is for corporate managers and government agencies alike to see, keep 
track of, and manage the cumulative mass of critical points of risk. 
Likewise, the bigger the megasystem, the greater the daily internal 
economic and political pressures to maximize short-term benefits, and, 
perversely, to fractionalize vigilance. 
 In the Gulf of Mexico region, fractionalized and less-than-vigilant 
government management practices appear to have been pervasive, 
paralleling insufficient industry operational practices. State and feder-
al agencies exhibited negligence and lassitude toward operations of all 
the oil companies in the Gulf, not just BP.32 Critical geological infor-
mation was routinely insufficiently available to permitting authorities 
and oversight monitors.33 The various oil production transport sys-
tems—tankers, lighters, and pipelines—have broadly posed their own 
problems of safety and environmental threat and have not been ade-
quately factored into the regulatory process.34 And the risks are syn-
ergistic. For example, the construction and maintenance of pipelines 
and transit canals through barrier islands and Delta lands, to service 
hundreds of near-shore oil operations—between 9000 and 10,000 
miles of channelization in Louisiana—has been virtually unaccounted 
for in oil permitting, but was a major reason why Hurricanes Katrina 
and Rita found coastal populations so unprotected.35 
                                                                                                                           
32 Plater, supra note 3, at 11,042. 
33 Eric French et al., Trade Secrets and Proprietary Information, D.128, at 2 (Nov. 5, 
2010) (unpublished research memorandum), available at 
http://www.bc.edu/environmental 
law (follow “Boston College Law School Land & Environmental Law Program Submission 
to the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling” 
hyperlink). 
34 Oliver A. Houck, Down on the Batture 205 (2010); Oliver A. Houck, Land Loss in 
Coastal Louisiana: Causes, Consequences, and Remedies, 58 Tul. L. Rev. 3, 25–28 (1983). The 
serious social externalities of oil industry practices in Louisiana are illustrated in the famous 
Testbank case. See Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985). 
35 See Melanie MacWilliams-Brooks et al., Categorical Exclusions from EIS, D.107, at 4–
5 (Nov. 5, 2010) (unpublished research memorandum), available at 
http://www.bc.edu/envi- 
ronmentallaw (follow “Boston College Law School Land & Environmental Law Program 
Submission to the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Off-
shore Drilling” hyperlink); see also Joel Sartore, Image 1346387 of Official National Geographic 
Prints Store, Nat’l Geographic, http://gallery.pictopia.com/natgeo/photo/9190416/ (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2011) (depicting canals carved through Louisiana wetlands). 
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II. The Hazards of Megasystem Centripetal Di-polarity 
The commission found a low level of vigilance and a discomforting level of 
comfort between the industry and Coast Guard regulators. State regula-
tion had been withdrawn.36 
A. Patterns of Preparation Failure: Alaska to the Gulf of Mexico 
 The preconditions for destructive discharges from oil megasys-
tems can lie latent within the process of planning, permitting, con-
structing and operating oil drilling systems, and designing insufficient 
precautionary safeguards. In Alaska the 1990 Commission noted that 
the entire system had been developed with shortcuts and a primary 
focus on production rather than safety.37 The official state and local 
regulatory agencies often uncritically accepted industry data and as-
surances on the design and safety of system elements, issued permits 
without required documentation, did not insist on strict compliance 
with corporate and federal rules, and, on occasions when they at-
tempted to assert regulatory vigilance, were resisted, delayed, or over-
turned by the industry’s greater resources and political momentum.38 
The “revolving door” between industry and regulators produced what 
political science describes as agency capture.39 
 As the Alaska Oil Spill Commission investigations revealed, the 
Alyeska Owners’ Committee, led by BP, systematically cut back on 
critical safety measures.40 The Alyeska Owners’ Committee successful-
ly pressured the U.S. Coast Guard to accept a variety of regulatory 
changes, including: making the Sound’s vehicle separation zone volun-
                                                                                                                           
36 Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 186. 
37 See id. at 34–36. 
38 See generally id. at 34–59. At the commencement of the pipeline, the State of Alaska 
passed a protective statute establishing stricter standards for tanker safety and pollution 
avoidance. In response, the industry’s management consortium successfully attacked 
most of the law on preemption grounds in federal district court. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Hammond, No. A 77-195, 1978 A.M.C. 1697, 1712–14 (D. Alaska June 30, 1978). The state 
only appealed some minor provisions of the law, which were deemed unpreempted by 
the Ninth Circuit. Chevron U.S.A., et al. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483, 501 (9th Cir. 1984). 
39 See Stewart, supra note 9, at 1684–87. 
40 See Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 7 (“[O]ne basic conclusion of this re-
port is that the grounding at Bligh Reef represents much more than the error of a possi-
bly drunken skipper: It was the result of the gradual degradation of oversight and safety 
practices that had been intended, 12 years before, to safeguard and backstop the inevita-
ble mistakes of human beings.”). 
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tary rather than mandatory;41 loosening agreed-upon requirements for 
industry-financed high-resolution radar systems;42 firing the around-
the-clock expert loading crews at the Valdez Marine Terminal to save 
$10 million a year in costs, thereby forcing ships’ crews to take on the 
exhausting and delicate job of loading their tankers carefully to avoid 
structural failure;43 and excusing industry from having to fund a rapid 
response station on Hinchinbrook Island—which could have quickly 
accessed the Exxon Valdez on Bligh Reef and captured virtually all the 
discharged oil before it got caught up by wind and currents.44 And 
when the big one occurred, the megasystem’s failure to prepare for a 
major spill was grimly evident. 
 Similar complacency and inappropriate collusion is increasingly 
revealed in narrative details from the Gulf of Mexico oil production 
system.45 Regulators and those being regulated operated together in 
                                                                                                                           
41 Though depicted as sharp vessel separation corridors on the nautical chart of 
Prince William Sound, the separation zone is not mandatory. See id. at 8–9. The author 
was informed during Commission investigations that under the 1980 Inland Navigation 
Rules, the separation zone for Prince William Sound had not been designated as a man-
datory lane divider. Under current regulations, vessel separation zones are now general-
ly mandatory. See 33 C.F.R. § 83.10 (2010). 
42 See Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 35; supra note 29 and accompanying 
text. Requirements for higher-quality radar had been reduced at industry’s request to 
permit the utilization of less expensive radar systems, despite initial assurances that best 
available radar technology would be installed. Interview with Havelock, supra note 27. 
“When I was Attorney General [representatives of industry and the U.S. Coast Guard] 
assured me that BAT for radar would be installed in Prince William Sound. It wasn’t. It 
was lousy technology.” Id. (Commission Executive Director Havelock served as Attorney 
General for the State of Alaska from 1970 to 1973). 
43 See Plater, supra note 29, at 7. 
44 See Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 39. Incidents in the Sound could have 
been addressed more rapidly and directly if the planned Hinchinbrook Island response 
station existed: 
The need to deploy equipment to a spill from several locations rather than 
just from the Valdez terminal began to receive consideration in late Decem-
ber. Rear Adm. J.B. Hayes, Commander 17th Coast Guard District, provided 
the sharpest initial focus in a Dec. 28, 1976, letter to A.P. Rollins, Jr., the chief 
federal pipeline officer. Hayes noted that response times for vessels sta-
tioned in Valdez to a spill in Hinchinbrook Entrance had been determined to 
be seven to eight hours. “It is strongly recommended that Alyeska preposi-
tion appropriate response resources in the vicinity of Hinchinbrook En-
trance.” Although similar recommendations followed and became more 
specific, Alyeska never responded. 
Id. 
45 Reports indicate that the MMS officials and industry personnel enjoyed social ex-
cursions together—often in improperly close relationships characterized as “a culture of 
ethical failure,” “a culture of substance abuse and promiscuity,” and “a pattern of abuses 
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symbiotic relationships reflecting the fact that they considered them-
selves part of the same unitary community.46 Deepwater drilling at 
unprecedented depths was undertaken with casual oversight and lax 
requirements for drill plans.47 Categorical exclusions from full envi-
ronmental reviews were granted for deepwater drilling, and the poten-
tial for blowouts ignored as virtually impossible, ignoring data show-
ing that blowout preventers are prone to failure.48 Monitoring and 
enforcement of regulations was haphazard.49 If violations were as-
sessed, they were vigorously contested to burden and deter further 
enforcement.50 
 Internally, corporate management decisions can too easily be 
based on short-term economic gain. Despite high hazard locations, 
great technological challenges, and high risk potentials, operations 
decisions over time are likely to be managed in business terms, domi-
nated by shareholder and managerial expectations of high revenues, 
rather than public concern for human and ecosystem safety.51 Internal 
                                                                                                                           
and mismanagement.” Charlie Savage, Sex, Drug Use and Graft Cited in Interior Depart-
ment, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 2008, at A1. 
46 See Jason DeParle, Leading the Way Into Deep Water, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 2010, at 
A1. “‘Obviously we’re all oil industry,’ said Larry Williamson, the [MMS] district man-
ager. ‘We’re all from the same part of the country. Almost all our inspectors have worked 
for oil companies. . . . They grew up in the same towns.’” Id. 
47 See Randy Lee Loftis, Risks of Deep-water Drilling get Brush-off, Anchorage Daily 
News, (July 15, 2010, 7:51 AM), http://adn.com/2010/07/01/1349546/depper-oil-wells-in-
gulf-pose.html. 
48 See David Barstow et al., Between Blast and Spill, One Last, Flawed Hope, N.Y. Times, 
June 21, 2010, at A1; DeParle, supra note 46. 
49 See, e.g., Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 47 (noting that Alyeska’s contin-
gency plan met “‘regulation requirements on paper’” but would have failed a “‘reality 
test’” (citation omitted)); id. at 58–59 (finding that no effective enforcement policy was 
available beyond shutting down the pipeline). 
50 BP’s stance over the years was typified by its contesting safety violations in Texas 
City explosions and otherwise. See Press Release, BP, BP Texas City Refinery Formally 
Contests OSHA Citations (Oct. 30, 2010), available at 
http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?cate- 
goryId=2012968&contentId=7057595; David Batty, BP to Pay $50m Fine For Safety Viola-
tions After Texas City Explosion, Guardian (Aug. 12, 2010, 9:28 PM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
business/2010/aug/12/bp-texas-city-explosion-fine (“BP initially contested paying the 
entire amount . . . .”); Ben W. Heineman, Jr., Valuing Safety is Good for Companies’ Bottom 
Line, Atlantic (Apr. 19, 2010, 10:40 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/ 
2010/04/valuing-safety-is-good-for-companies-bottom-line/39128/ (“In October 2009, 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration announced it was levying an $87 
million fine against BP for failing to correct problems which caused the 2005 explosion; 
BP is contesting those charges.”). 
51 See Ravi Somaiya, The Road to Deepwater Horizon: BP’s Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico 
Was a Disaster Three Decades in the Making, Newsweek, July 13, 2010, 
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corporate culture is likely to be dominated by whatever the dominant 
partner’s corporate agenda and policies may be. Compounding this 
structure is a chief shortcoming—industry typically maintains its strict 
right to hold company information confidential, even where that data 
is of critical public importance.52 
 BP may have been particularly prone to cutting corners in its 
dominance of the Alyeska management company and in the Gulf,53 
but the comfortable relationships with the Interior Department’s Min-
erals Management Service (MMS), and its lax oversight were shared 
by all the Gulf drilling companies.54 In Louisiana especially, and to a 
lesser extent in other Gulf States, oil is king and close accommodation 
with the oil industry at the state as well as federal level was standard 
operating procedure.55 
                                                                                                                           
http://www.newsweek.com/ 
2010/07/13/the-road-to-deepwater-horizon.html (discussing the tension between “profits 
and safety” at BP during the time leading up to the spill). See generally Vsevolod Tataren-
kov, Supplement to Research Memo No. 102, at 6–10 (Nov. 19, 2010) (unpublished research 
memorandum), available at http://www.bc.edu/environmentallaw (follow “Boston College 
Law School Land & Environmental Law Program Submission to the National Commission 
on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling” hyperlink) (reporting a par-
tial catalog of risk-enhancing operational decisions in the Alaska setting). 
52 For example, during the “mad cow” scare involving Creuzfeldt-Jakob disease in 
beef, government agencies were pressured: 
to keep secret the names of the retail outlets selling food subject to recalls. 
This agreement left consumers essentially in the dark, unable to protect 
themselves and their families from the possibility of ingesting contaminated 
meat. The USDA and DHS actions suggest that protecting the “proprietary 
information” of the meat industry is of greater importance than protecting 
public health and the safety of the food supply. 
Elisa Obadashian, Senior Policy Analyst Consumers Union, Testimony Before the Cali-
fornia Legislature on Mad Cow Disease (Feb. 24, 2004), available at 
http://www.consumers 
union.org/pub/core_food_safety/000879.html; see also French et al., supra note 33, at 2–3. 
53 See Schwartz, supra note 28. 
54 See DeParle, supra note 46. BP was not the only oil company in the Gulf that enjoyed 
lax enforcement including blanket categorical exemptions from environmental review. For 
Gulf of Mexico projects generally, MMS had been granting between 250 and 400 waivers a 
year. Juliet Eilperin, U.S. Exempted BP’s Gulf of Mexico Drilling From Environmental Impact 
Study, Wash. Post, May 5, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/ 
05/04/AR2010050404118.html. The reported industry-agency improprieties did not single 
out BP as an exception. See Savage, supra note 45. 
55 See DeParle, supra note 46. For example, after Katrina it was apparent that a major 
contributor to inland flooding and the destruction of buffering coastal marshes was the 
9000 miles of oil industry canals cut through coastal marshes to serve drilling operations, 
but this fact was generally not mentioned. See Houck, Land Loss in Coastal Louisiana, supra 
note 34, at 26, 75–78; Oliver Houck, Who Will Pay to Fix Louisiana?, Nation, July 12, 2010, 
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B. Failures in Response Plans 
 In the circumstances of their post-calamity responses as well, the 
two oil disasters, two decades apart, reveal distressingly similar sys-
temic failures in response preparation and implementation. Contin-
gency plans are the heart of response effectiveness, and in both cases 
the official contingency plans were largely fiction. The BP Gulf of 
Mexico plan notoriously included consideration of walruses, not 
found south of Seattle,56 minimized the possibility of a blowout, and 
wildly exaggerated the practicability of discharge capture and clean-
up.57 The official Alaska plan had failed within forty-eight hours; a 
generic default Exxon corporate plan had to be brought in.58 Although 
recommendations were made and we had the opportunity to learn 
from Alaska, twenty years later the command structure in the Gulf of 
Mexico was uncertain, with state and federal representatives stepping 
on one another’s toes and BP not under their command and control.59 
                                                                                                                           
at 11 (describing Louisiana’s reliance on the oil and gas industry); MacWilliams-Brooks et 
al., supra note 35, at 6. 
56 Walruses in Louisiana? Eyebrow-Raising Details of BP’s Spill Response Plan, Reuters, 
May 27, 2010, available at http://blogs.reuters.com/environment/2010/05/27/walruses-in-
louis- 
iana-eyebrow-raising-details-of-bps-spill-response-plan/. 
57 See Cain Burdeau & Holbrook Mohr, BP Downplayed Possibility of Major Oil Spill, 
Boston.com, May 1, 2010, available at 
http://www.boston.com/news/science/articles/2010/ 
05/01/bp_downplayed_possibility_of_major_oil_spill/; Holbrook Mohr et al., BP Spill 
Response Plans Severely Flawed, MSNBC, June 9, 2010, available at http://www.msnbc.msn. 
com/id/37599810/ns/disaster_in_the_gulf/ (“There weren’t supposed to be any coast-
line problems because the site was far offshore. ‘Due to the distance to shore (48 miles) 
and the response capabilities that would be implemented, no significant adverse impacts 
are expected,’ the site plan says.”). Attention to preparation for dealing with a large 
blowout, not to mention a blowout at mile-depths, would seem an obvious concern given 
the well-known and destructive Ixtoc blowout in the Gulf’s Bay of Campeche in 1979. See 
Ramon Antonio Vargas, 1979's Ixtoc Oil Well Blowout in Gulf of Mexico Has Startling Paral-
lels to Current Disaster, Times-Picayune (July 4, 2010 10:44 AM), 
http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-
spill/index.ssf/2010/07/1979s_ixtoc_oil_well_blowout_i.html. 
58Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 161, app. N at 1–2 (detailing a timeline of 
Days 2 and 3 of the spill). 
59 In contingency plans, equipment and funding are the responsibility of the industry 
rather than the federal taxpayer. See Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 156 (“Recom-
mendation 38: Government in Charge. The spiller should not be in charge of response to a 
major spill. A spiller should be obligated to respond with all the resources it can summon, 
but government should command that response.”); id. at 162 (“Recommendation 48: Inci-
dent Command System. “A formal command structure known as the Incident Command 
System should be used to direct [the industry-provided] response to oil spills.”). The Oil 
Spill Liability Trust Fund, the primary institutional source of spill response funding, is 
funded by industry penalties, liability assessments, taxes, and fees. See 26 U.S.C. § 9509(b) 
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 The Alaska Commission focused on the need for designing and 
implementing a decisive and unified incident command, a call that 
OPA-90’s National Contingency Plan essentially avoided in practice.60 
In addition to asserting the need for governmental command authori-
ty over industry equipment and personnel, the Commission called for 
shifting oil spill containment and cleanup responsibilities to the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers if the Coast Guard proved incapable of as-
serting stronger command authority,61 and criticized U.S. EPA’s lack 
of regulatory energy in oil spill prevention and response.62 
C. Dangerous Dispersants: Regulators Bowing to Industry 
 EPA’s continued failure to scrutinize and regulate dispersants has 
been a critical element in the shortcomings of national spill response.63 
Dispersants, in fact, provide one of the most significant examples of 
dysfunctional contingency response mechanisms in the di-polar man-
agement of oil industry risk. Despite warnings from the Alaska Com-
mission twenty years previously,64 industry-led contingency planning 
and government acquiescence resulted in vigorous and indiscriminate 
use of dispersants in response to oil spills, rather than mechanical sur-
face collection technologies—booms and skimmer craft, which are 
more effective and less destructive to human and ecological health, 
but more expensive to maintain and operate.65 
                                                                                                                           
(2006). As the Alaska Commission noted, command must be governmental, yet when the 
U.S. EPA command ordered BP to sharply restrict the use of Corexit dispersants, BP de-
murred, persuading the Coast Guard to allow continued extensive use. See David A. 
Fahrenthold & Steven Mufson, Documents Indicate Heavy Use of Dispersants in Gulf Oil Spill, 
Wash. Post, Aug. 1, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/07/31/AR2010073102381. 
html. 
60 Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 162; see 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d) (2006). Imple-
mentation of the National Incident Management System often reflected disorganization and 
insufficient preparation. See Jim McKay, Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill Prompts Debate on NIMS, 
Unified Response, Emergency Mgmt. (Sept. 13, 2010), 
http://www.icyte.com/system/snapshots/fs1/ 
c/4/b/8/c4b8dd4e4209a32417d138cedf77c01a59fd76c0/index.html?anno_id=327017. 
61 Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 156 (Recommendation 39). 
62 Id. at 157 (Recommendation 40). 
63 Riki Ott, Sound Truth and Corporate Myth$: The Legacy of the Exxon Valdez Oil 
Spill 422–27 (2005). The necessity, and shortcomings, of EPA’s scrutiny of dispersants are 
analyzed at length in Dr. Riki Ott’s major compilation of post-Exxon Valdez Oil Spill 
accounting. See id. 
64 See Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 198–99. 
65 See Vsevolod Tatarenkov, The Marine Spill Response Corporation: A Closer Look, 
D.102, at 2–3 (Nov. 5, 2010) (unpublished research memorandum), available at http://www. 
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 As the consequences of the BP Deepwater blowout continue to be 
revealed, the previously-unfamiliar word “dispersant” may well 
achieve the same kind of public-awareness notoriety as the once-
unknown “chad.”66 Dispersants were targeted by the Alaska Com-
mission as deeply problematic, but are nonetheless strongly favored 
by industry for a variety of salient reasons. Dispersants are cheaper in 
terms of out-of-pocket costs to the spiller than removal actions.67 Per-
haps even more compelling, dispersants are “optically” preferable: 
they play a key role in the “out-of-sight, out-of-mind” response strat-
egy.68 If oil can be sunk beneath the surface and broken up into bil-
lions of small suspended droplets, it becomes invisible, lessens the 
images of fouled beaches and dying wildlife, and its existence can be 
doubted and denied.69 By discharging a torrent of dispersants a mile 
below the surface, the objective is to prevent much of the oil from ever 
reaching visibility at the surface. However, if oil does reach the shore, 
dispersants can, to some extent, achieve surface cleaning.70 In Alaska, 
high-pressure spraying of dispersants on stony beaches was a major 
objective for Exxon in creating news video of successful post-spill 
cleanup.71 
 But dispersants have serious destructive effects when released 
into the environment, and not just for wildlife. In Alaska temporary 
workers hired to spray dispersants on Prince William Sound and on 
the beaches reported a litany of physical effects from exposure to 
                                                                                                                           
bc.edu/environmentallaw (follow “Boston College Law School Land & Environmental Law 
Program Submission to the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 
and Offshore Drilling” hyperlink). 
66 See, e.g., Bryan Walsh, Oil Spill: What’s Going on Under the Gulf?, Time (Aug. 2, 2010, 
6:55 PM), http://ecocentric.blogs.time.com/2010/08/02/oil-spill-whats-going-on-under-
the-gulf/; HBO’s “Recount” Revists the Hanging Chad, NPR (May 25, 2008), 
http://www.npr.org/tem- 
plates/story/story.php?storyId=90813445. 
67 See Dagmar Schmidt Etkin, Cutter Info. Corp., Estimating Cleanup Costs For Oil 
Spills 5 (1999), available at http://www.environmental-research.com/publications/pdf/ 
1999-IOSC-Cost.pdf. 
68 See Rocky Kistner, Dispersant Controversy, Oil Plumes Persist in the Gulf, Switchboard: 
Nat. Resources Def. Council Staff Blog (Aug. 20, 2010), http://switchboard.nrdc.org/ 
blogs/rkistner/down_a_winding_road_that.html. 
69 See Matthew Brown, Underwater Oil Plumes Disputed by BP CEO Tony Hayward, 
Huffington Post (May 30, 2010, 8:55 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/30/ 
underwater-oil-plumes-dis_n_595015.html. 
70 Int’l Tanker Owners Pollution Fed’n Ltd, Technical Information Paper: The Use of 
Chemical Dispersants to Treat Oil Spills 5 (2005), available at http://www. 
itopf.com/_assets/documents/tip4.pdf. 
71 Plater, supra note 3, at 11,044. 
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backspray.72 “We’re peeing blood,” the author was told, “We can’t let 
the foremen know or they’ll send us home to Texas, but if it’s doing 
this to us, what’s it doing to the places we’re spraying?”73 In Alaska 
today, beaches that had been sprayed with dispersants reportedly 
demonstrate greater continued ecological damage than beaches that 
were never “cleaned.”74 Down on the Gulf of Mexico there are not on-
ly reports of dolphins dying with bloody hemorrhages around their 
blowholes and in their internal organs, but dispersant workers have 
started to pass blood in their urine, as well.75 
 Dispersants in the water column not only kill marine mammals, 
fish, and other larger life forms, but may have even greater long-term 
ecosystem effects. The BP Deepwater Horizon blowout occurred at the 
Gulf of Mexico’s season of maximum larval production for fish, shell-
fish, and the myriad smaller life forms that support the fecundity of the 
Gulf.76 Dispersants make the oil miscible, hanging in subsurface cur-
tain plumes of tiny droplets of heavy oil-cum-dispersant that can di-
rectly contaminate or be consumed by whatever they touch.77 “Clouds 
of larva, billions, even trillions of them, are drifting in that water col-
umn,” a federal biologist told the author.78 “They move up and down 
according to temperature and light, and when they hit those plumes of 
suspended subsurface oil, it’s all over for them.”79 The genetic damage 
to ecosystems in Alaska is still tangible. Herring populations and the 
                                                                                                                           
72 See Ott, supra note 63, at 29, 32–33. 
73 Interview with oil clean-up worker in Valdez, Alaska (Aug. 19, 1989). 
74 Interview with Dr. Riki Ott, toxicologist and author, in La. (Aug. 9, 2010). 
75 See Hannah Rogers-Ganter et al., Recommendations for Better Protecting Human 
Health in the Wake of Offshore Oil Spills, D.121, at 2 (Nov. 5, 2010) (unpublished research 
memorandum), available at http://www.bc.edu/environmentallaw (follow “Boston College 
Law School Land & Environmental Law Program Submission to the National Commission 
on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling” hyperlink); Maryann Tobin, 
2010 Oil Spill: Dolphins Suffer Internal Bleeding, Rescued Birds Fly Back to Oil Spill From Tampa, 
Examiner (June 8, 2010, 12:12 AM), http://www.examiner.com/animal-welfare-in-tampa-
bay/ 
2010-oil-spill-dolphins-suffer-internal-bleeding-rescued-birds-fly-back-to-oil-spill-from-
tampa. 
76 William R. Freudenburg & Robert Gramling, Blowout in the Gulf: The BP Oil Spill 
Disaster and the Future of Energy in America 12 (2011). 
77 David Biello, Massive Oil Plume Confirmed in Gulf of Mexico, Sci. Am. (Aug. 19, 
2010), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=masive-oil-plume-confirmed-
in-gulf-of-mexico. 
78 Telephone interview with federal biologist in Fla. (June, 2010) (interview was con-
fidential). 
79 Id. 
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major Alaska herring fishery have never recovered,80 and Prince Wil-
liam Sound’s primary pod of orca killer whales has not had a success-
ful reproduction since the spill.81 If the Alaska Commission’s recom-
mendations had been heeded it is likely that dispersants would play 
no part, or a significantly reduced role, in spill response. Instead, spill 
response would focus on adoption of advanced skimmer oil capture 
technology,82 nontoxic coagulants which can operate in the subsurface 
water column as well as on the surface,83 high-volume separation and 
retrieval systems,84 and even short term combustion approaches,85 in 
addition to greatly enhanced prevention.86 But it was not to be. 
                                                                                                                           
80 Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Tr. Council, Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Restoration Plan: 2010 
Update—Injured Resources and Services 27–29 (2010), available at http:// 
www.evostc.state.ak.us/Universal/Documents/Publications/2010IRSUpdate.pdf. 
81 Brandon Keim, Unique Killer-Whale Pod Doomed by Exxon Valdez, Wired Sci. (Mar. 24, 
2009, 11:45 AM), http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2009/03/valdezwhales/. In light 
of the extremely long-term latencies in the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez, and current re-
ports of continuing major die-offs in the Gulf, it is difficult to sustain the contention made 
by Kenneth Feinberg, administrator of the BP Deepwater Horizon Disaster Victim Com-
pensation Fund, and others, that the vast majority of harms from the BP spill will essential-
ly have been realized in one more year’s time, by 2012. See Catherine Clifford, Gulf Oil Spill 
victims offered 3 years’ damages, CNNMoney.com (Feb. 2, 2011), 
http://money.cnn.com/2011/02/02/small 
business/bp_claims_feinberg_final_payments/index.htm (Feinberg’s facility “predicted 
that the region will fully recover from the disaster in 2012,” with the possible exception of 
oyster harvesting, which was granted four years of damages). Cf. Suzanne Goldenburg, Has 
BP Really Cleaned up the Gulf Oil Spill?, Guardian (London), Apr. 13, 2011, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/apr/13/deepwater-horizon-gulf-mexico-
oil-spill (“In the past year, [marine scientist Samantha] Joye—as well as other independent 
scientists—has repeatedly challenged the official version of the oil disaster put forward by 
the White House and other administration officials. . . . In December, Joye’s team knocked 
down another White House claim—that the vast majority of the oil was gone—when she 
discovered a thick coating of oil, dead starfish and other organisms on the bottom of the 
ocean, over an area of 2,900 square miles.”) 
82 See Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 105–06. Some scientists have argued 
that it is preferable and less damaging to keep the oil on the surface. If oil stays on the 
surface rather than mixing deep in the water column it is retrievable by the kind of effec-
tive surface technology currently used in Europe; if submerged by dispersants then the 
oil cannot be retrieved. Telephone interview with Jeffrey Admon, NOLA Steel, Inc. (Nov. 
10, 2010) (discussing Dutch North Sea skimmer boom arm technology in North Sea oper-
ations); see also Eli Kintisch, Gulf Oil Spill: An Audacious Decision in Crisis Gets Cautious 
Praise, Science, Aug. 13, 2010, at 735, 736 (“NOAA Administrator Jane Lubchenco says 
one of the worst case scenarios involving longer exposures due to dispersed oil—big 
losses of spawning bluefin tuna populations—may not be detectable for years. That’s led 
some scientists to suggest that letting the oil rise to the surface would have been a better 
move, as it could be more easily collected.”). 
83 See Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 107. 
84 See id. at 105–06, 197. 
85 See id. at 125. 
86 See id. at 127. 
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 Today, as the EPA has quite belatedly hastened to test an array of 
dispersants, the agency’s tentative conclusions about dispersant toxici-
ty are cast into grave doubt by the Alaska experience. Tested disper-
sants appear in most cases to have been subjected only to short-term, 
high-dose acute toxicity tests of the dispersant alone, rather than com-
pleting the normal range of tests for toxicity, capabilities, and effica-
cy,87 with inconsistency in testing the dispersant and oil mixture—the 
form in which the substances occur in impacted waters.88 
 A number of oil industry contingency response functions in the 
Gulf of Mexico, as in Alaska, are consigned under official contingency 
response plans to industry-created service organizations.89 In the Gulf 
of Mexico, primary dependence is placed upon industry-created 
pooled response management corporations—the Marine Preservation 
Association (MPA) and the Marine Spill Response Corporation 
(MSRC)—and these entities tend to adopt procedures and technology 
                                                                                                                           
87 See Juliet Eilperin, Oil Dispersant Does Not Pose Environmental Threat, Early EPA 
Findings Suggest, Wash. Post (June 30, 2010, 9:01 PM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ 
content/article/2010/06/30/AR2010063004358.html. HPV Chemical Hazard Data Availability 
Study, Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://www.epa.gov/hpv/pubs/general/hazchem.htm (last 
updated Aug. 2, 2010) (“There are six basic tests which have been internationally agreed 
to for screening high production volume (HPV) chemicals for toxicity. The tests agreed to 
under the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Screening Infor-
mation Data Set (OECD/SIDS) program are: acute toxicity; chronic toxicity; developmen-
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toxic than either the dispersant or crude oil by themselves. See Robert A. Perkins et al., 
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Species Exposed to Crude Oil and Dispersant, 42 Cold Regions Sci. & Tech. 226, 227 (2005). 
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Ashford & Claudia S. Miller, Chemical Exposures: Low Levels and High Stakes 3–10 (2d 
Ed. 1998), available at 
http://drclaudiamiller.com/Articles/Chemical_Exposures_Low_Levels_ 
and_High_Stakes_2nd_Ed.pdf. Additionally, for clean-up workers from the Exxon Val-
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Annie K. O’Neill, Self-Reported Exposures and Health Status Among Workers from the 
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Cleanup, at iv (2003) (unpublished MPH thesis, Yale University), 
available at http://rikiott.com/pdf/oneill_thesis.pdf. 
89 See, e.g., Home, Marine Spill Response Corp., http://www.msrc.org (last visited Apr. 
15, 2011); Why MPA, Marine Preservation Ass’n, http://www.mpaz.org (last visited Apr. 
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that serve industry agendas rather than public interests.90 The delega-
tion of official functions to private entities creates inherent tensions—
between serving the avowed civic public goals of maximizing safety 
and effective incident response on one hand, and the pressing busi-
ness agendas of the industry partners on the other. Financial interest, 
media-management interests, and market ratings measured in quar-
terly performances all militate in favor of narrowed goals and strate-
gies, for example, the continuing use of dispersants.91 This problematic 
internal culture figured heavily in the Alaska Commission’s conclu-
sions and recommendations and is directly and problematically pre-
sented in Gulf of Mexico operations, and in contingency response 
planning with industry-constituted risk and response management 
corporations. 
 In both Gulf megasystems, industry pressure and agency lassi-
tude combined to lessen operational vigilance and risk-preventing 
design, and to undercut the preparation and implementation of effec-
tive responses when disaster struck. 
III. RCACs: An Innovative Expansion Beyond the Traditional  
Di-polar Model, and Challenges Encountered 
 Of the fifty-nine commission recommendations in the wake of the 
Exxon Valdez, heavy industry lobbying during passage of OPA-90 
blocked or diluted many of these recommendations.92 The emerging 
story of Gulf of Mexico deepwater drilling frustratingly reflects how 
beneficial it might have been if those Alaskan recommendations had 
been implemented nationally in the wake of the Exxon Valdez. 
 Beyond its recommendations for comprehensive prevention poli-
cy and operational safety commitments,93 the Alaska Oil Spill Com-
mission urged that government and corporate performance standards 
specifically require BAT—best available technology, a fundamentally 
rational suggestion that could have made a significant difference in 
the Gulf of Mexico.94 The Alaska Commission also recommended that 
enhanced state and local regulatory involvement be encouraged ra-
                                                                                                                           
90 See Tatarenkov, supra note 65, at 2; Becoming a Customer, Marine Spill Response 
Corp., http://www.msrc.org/Membership.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
91 See Tatarenkov, supra note 65, at 3–4. 
92 See Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–380, 104 Stat. 484 (codified at 33 
U.S.C. §§ 2701–3207 (2006). 
93 See Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 129–32. 
94 See id. at 135 (Recommendation 7). 
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ther than preempted.95 Recommendations at the federal level included 
calls for mandatory corporate safety reporting, minmum personnel 
levels, revised insurance antitrust exemptions, and an intensified vigi-
lance role for the Coast Guard.96 
 In addition to seeking “regulatory vigilance in government agen-
cies” and “corporate attitudes that put safety first,” a prime innovation 
of the Alaska Commission, only partially integrated into OPA-90, was 
the proposed creation of institutionalized citizen watchdog councils—
RCACs.97 These councils, made up of citizens representing interests 
that would be grievously harmed if risk-prevention and incident re-
sponse measures fail, aim to break up tendencies toward complacency, 
collusion, and neglect within the industry-agency management model 
that characterizes the field.98 Integrated into several Commission rec-
ommendations,99 this structural reform innovation in effect pluralized 
the di-polar governance model. Citizen councils would strategically 
institutionalize a functional, informed viewpoint on operations and 
risk from the external perspective of potentially-impacted members of 
the public. 
 RCACs—authorized in OPA-90100 but limited to Alaska waters 
by Capitol lobbying101—have become a significant but largely unher-
                                                                                                                           
95 See id. at 137–39 (Recommendation 11). An expressed congressional intent not to 
preempt state and local regulatory action would avoid the industry arguments that un-
dercut Alaska’s protective regulations in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond. See No. A 77-
195, 1978 A.M.C. 1697, 1712–14 (D. Alaska June 30, 1978). The Commission also noted the 
particular utility of interstate compacts. Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 142 
(Recommendation 18). 
96 Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 149–51 (Recommendations 31–33). 
97 See id. at 139–40, 186. 
98 Id. at app. M 6–9. In framing its citizen council recommendations, the Commission 
was building upon the suggestions of Rick Steiner, former Professor at the University of 
Alaska, Anchorage. Plater, supra note 3, at 11,046. 
99 Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 131 (”Recommendation 3: Citizen 
knowledge of risk. Because many individuals and communities are placed at risk by mod-
ern oil transportation systems, citizens should be involved in oversight arrangements at 
every level of government”); id. at 139 (“Recommendation 12: Oversight council. A citizens 
advisory council should be established in the Office of the Governor and given responsibil-
ity for overseeing the safe transportation of oil, gas and other hazardous substances”), id. at 
146 (“Recommendation 26: Regional advisory committees. A system of regional advisory 
councils should be formalized under state authority to oversee harbor administration, state 
and federal regulation and private safety functions”), id. at 163 (“Recommendation 49: En-
larged community role. A substantive role should be given to the affected communities in 
any response system”). 
100 33 U.S.C. § 2732(d) (2006). 
101 Id. § 2732(b), (d) (authorizing the creation of two RCACs only in Alaska). It is of 
course difficult to pin down the intrigues of Capitol lobbying, but Alaska Commission 
Executive Director Havelock, who went to Washington while OPA-90 was being debated 
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alded product of the Exxon Valdez disaster. The RCAC model could 
well be integrated into a post-Deepwater Horizon management sys-
tem for the Gulf and other oil production areas. 
 Currently there are two RCACs in existence in the United States, 
both of which are independent but industry-funded: the Prince Wil-
liam Sound RCAC (PWS-RCAC) and the Cook Inlet RCAC (CI-
RCAC).102 For over twenty years, both the PWS-RCAC and the CI-
RCAC have addressed environmental protection and oil spill prepara-
tion within their respective communities with little recognition from 
the outside world103 and varying degrees of success.104 
 OPA-90 stipulates that industry funding for the Alaska RCACs is 
a basic requirement for the validity of contingency plans in the waters 
they serve.105 The PWS-RCAC is funded on an annual basis by the 
owners or operators of terminal facilities and tankers operating in 
Prince William Sound at a price-adjusted budget of up to $2 mil-
lion.106 The CI-RCAC receives funding up to $1 million.107 
A. RCAC Achievements 
 Over the past twenty years, each RCAC has achieved significant 
accomplishments in improving oil spill prevention and limiting the 
environmental impact of the oil industry within the region. Their 
achievements include: PWS-RCAC research and public advocacy re-
sulting in tanker escort tug requirements to enhance safe transit 
                                                                                                                           
in Congress, said that given the lobbying that accompanied the legislation, it is reasona-
ble to assume that it was the lobbying that resulted in RCACs not being extended to re-
gions beyond Alaska. Interview with John F. Havelock, supra note 27. 
102 See Horton, supra note 17, at 2. 
103 A study by George Busenberg appears to be the only serious analysis of the 
RCAC form. See generally George Busenberg, Citizen Advisory Councils and Environ-
mental Management in the Marine Oil Trade (1997) (unpublished technical report based 
on Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill), available at 
http://www.circac. 
org/documents/pdf/emc/CACEnvironMg.pdf. 
104 See id. at 65 (identifying factors which affect the success of RCACs). 
105 33 U.S.C. § 2732(k)(1). 
106 Id. § 2732(k)(2). A provision in subsection (o)(1) permitted oil companies to satis-
fy the requirements of the Act if they entered contracts that met specific funding and 
duration requirements with alternative advisory groups certified by the President to 
foster the general goals and purposes of the Act and to serve the communities and inter-
est groups in the vicinity of the oil terminals. Id. § 2732(o)(1). The PWS-RCAC serving 
today is of that alternative advisory group form. Id. 
107 Id. § 2732(k)(3). 
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through the Sound’s narrow passages;108 research, advocacy, and 
funding for radar system enhancement to detect icebergs within the 
Sound;109 research and advocacy leading to the installation of vapor 
controls to reduce air pollution hazards at tanker loading wharves;110 
co-development of 148 geographic response strategies (GRSs) for pro-
tection plans for environmentally sensitive areas in Prince William 
Sound and Kodiak;111 research and advocacy to understand and min-
imize the threat of non-indigenous marine organisms reaching Prince 
William Sound in oil tanker ballast water;112 and general monitoring of 
terminal operations and contingency planning.113 Officers and mem-
bers of the RCAC have a regular presence in discussions with industry 
and agency officials.114 In addition, the PWS-RCAC has, on a number 
of occasions, served as the confidential broker of whistleblowers’ fac-
tual tips from within the industry and government agencies.115 CI-
RCAC has helped to both shape forty-three GRSs tailored to protect 
specific sensitive areas within Cook Inlet and Kodiak Island from im-
pacts following a spill, and created a photographic baseline of the 
Cook Inlet coast at low tide as, among other functions, a potential aid 
to oil spill first responders.116 
 The Obama Administration, the Gulf Commission, and coastal 
communities in the Gulf area have recognized and discussed the po-
tential utility of an RCAC structure for the Gulf region.117 Based on 
                                                                                                                           
108 Prince William Sound Reg’l Citizens’ Advisory Council, What We’ve Accom-
plished 10 (2004), available at http://www.pwsrcac.org/docs/d0013400.pdf. 
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William Sound Iceberg Radar Project Comes Online (Dec. 20, 2002), available at 
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the BP National Commission Report’s recommendations, it is possible 
that upcoming amendments to OPA-90 will include a broadened au-
thorization for RCACs on the Gulf and other national coastlines sub-
ject to drilling.118 
 Had there been a Gulf RCAC, with representatives of the inshore 
and offshore commercial fisheries, sport fishing, tourism and recrea-
tion, it is unlikely that the recent rarefied technology of deepwater 
drilling would have been issued a permit without either an environ-
mental review, acknowledgment of the potential for spills reaching 
beaches and shores, a practicable contingency plan, basic geological 
data from BP, or even considering the possibility of a blowout. Institu-
tionalized representation of at-risk citizen interests and communities 
creates a dramatic change in the “low level of vigilance and a discom-
forting level of comfort between the industry and...regulators.”119 
B. Challenges Posed by the RCAC Format 
 The Alaska experience, however, has demonstrated some intrinsic 
challenges to effective representation of societal interests external to di-
polar industry-agency governance. First is the lack of subpoena pow-
er.120 Lobbyists in Congress successfully blocked subpoena authority 
for the RCACs in OPA-90, just as they blocked the grant of subpoena 
power for the current 2010 Commission.121 Funding issues arise annu-
ally for CI-RCAC, which has to negotiate with the industry combine to 
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and other information . . . .”). In its report to the President, the National Commission on 
the Deepwater Horizon spill makes numerous such recommendations that would require 
Congress to supply further authority and funding under the OPA-90 framework. 
119 Alaska Comm’n Report, supra note 1, at 186; see Horton, supra note 17, at 1. 
120 See Plater, supra note 3, at 11,046. 
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justify its budget each year.122 For a structural entity created to scruti-
nize industry and agency practices from an external public perspective, 
it is anomalous to require the scrutinizer to negotiate budget item ap-
proval from those being scrutinized. 
 Further, there has been strong evidence of RCAC co-optation in 
the case of CI-RCAC.123 The PWS-RCAC, on the other hand, is almost 
entirely composed of citizen representatives who are inclined to ex-
treme caution about risk.124 Prince William Sound citizens and local 
communities are not deeply tied to the oil industry as many in the 
Cook Inlet area are, but rather to fishing and natural resources— live-
lihoods which are directly threatened by oil spills.125 In Cook Inlet, 
however, the coastal communities are much more heavily dependent 
on oil payrolls,126 and oil-industry-dependent community officials 
sitting on that RCAC have consistently blunted the inquiries and risk-
monitoring functions of the Council.127 De facto co-optation of council 
members can eliminate the independent perspective and therapeutic 
value of a citizen watchdog council, and collapse the external eye of 
the innovative citizen council model back into the old di-polar estab-
lishment. The politics of the CI-RCAC municipalities is strongly influ-
enced by short term maximization of oil industry economic benefits, 
and tends to defer to the authority of corporate managers.128 
 If there is a realistic risk that citizens’ watchdog councils will be 
co-opted or suborned by pressures from the predominating industry 
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or agency establishments that the councils are designed to monitor 
and counter-balance, the RCAC structure can be neutered. If industry 
or agency whistleblowers who need confidentiality in passing public-
ly significant information to an RCAC know that the council has 
membership allied to their employers, the information-brokering role 
of the RCAC is nullified. The composition of RCACs thus must be 
constituted to assure their independence and critical external public 
perspective, leading to suggestions that citizen membership cannot be 
aligned with the di-polar establishments that the council entity is de-
signed to counter-balance.129 
 Institutionalizing the presence of independent at-risk citizen 
monitors, funded by the implicated industries, fundamentally chang-
es the centripetal tendency of di-polar industry-agency structures, 
opening them to transparency, increased compliance, and care-
enhancing public awareness. Adding this third leg to the di-polar de-
fault format for governance shifts the governmental geometry toward 
a Jeffersonian multicentric pluralism, where affected interests that 
were previously marginalized now are able to be actively involved in 
the governance process.130 The new triangulation created by RCACs 
and other third-party empowerments can help avoid losing public 
and individual values in the tangles of the traditionally insulated di-
polar political-economic marketplace. 
Conclusion 
 In the aftermath of the Gulf of Mexico BP Deepwater Horizon 
blowout spill, the American governance system has the opportunity to 
harvest conclusions about causation—“why did this calamity hap-
pen?”—and about necessary fundamental changes in how we manage 
the extraction and transport of oil in the future. Poised against this cor-
rective agenda is the natural tendency of the industry, and the com-
                                                                                                                           
129 See Horton, supra note 17, at 1. This memorandum suggested that, as in various 
pollution regulatory boards, membership can exclude direct and indirect representatives 
of the regulated entities. Id. at 5. Precedent for this proposition comes from the federal 
pollution statutes and cases like Bayside Timber Co. v. Board of Supervisors of San Mateo 
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luma Gaslight Co., 63 P. 1011, 1012 (Cal. 1901))). 
130 See Horton, supra note 17, at 1. 
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munities that depend economically upon it, to avert systemic changes 
that will potentially constrain ongoing economic patterns. 
 Vivid disasters create practical possibilities for systemic im-
provement, but only if systemic flaws are publicly perceived and sys-
temic lessons learned. The Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989, and the State 
of Alaska Oil Spill Commission Report of 1990, distilled some highly 
significant perceptions and recommendations for systemic improve-
ments,131 but many did not translate into the federal OPA-90 legisla-
tion passed in response to the public dismay at the Alaska calamity. 
132 Those that were included tended to become suborned by the cul-
ture of complacency, collusion, and neglect that the Alaska Commis-
sion had identified as the precondition and cause of that disaster.133 
 The Gulf of Mexico trauma presents yet another opportunity to 
learn from disaster. The ongoing work of the National Commission on 
the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling shows 
hopeful signs of not squandering the learning-teaching moment.134 
And if there is to be a fundamental change in the current megasystem 
with its systemic deficiencies, it makes good sense to have the 
megasystem of the future include the structural innovation of an ac-
tive citizen participant counterweight within the governance structure 
itself, to serve the public interest better this time around as we await 
an ultimately necessary shift away from fossil fuels. 
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